


**Joe Slovo**

# **South Africa - No Middle Road**

1976



## **First Half**

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*\*in the Second Half*

**Table 1**

**(a) Population of South Africa at 30 June 1974**

<i>Africans</i>	<i>Coloureds</i>	<i>Asians</i>	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Total</i>
17,745,000	2,306,000	709,000	4,160,000	24,920,000
(71,2%)	(9,3%)	(2,8%)	(16,7%)	

Source: Bulletin of Statistics, December 1974, Department of Statistics, Pretoria.  
Estimates based in 1970 Census.

**(b) Rate of population growth between 1960 and 1970**

<i>Africans</i>	<i>Coloureds</i>	<i>Asians</i>	<i>Whites</i>
36,3%	32,3%	28,7%	2,4%

Source: Preliminary figures released by the Department of Statistics, Pretoria, for the period 8 September 1960 to 6 May 1970.

**(c) Distribution of Africans between 'White South Africa' and the 'Homelands'**

<i>'White areas'</i>	<i>'Homelands'</i>
8,060,773	6,994,179

Source: Bulletin of Statistics, December 1974, Department of Statistics, Pretoria.  
Figures based on 1970 population.

**(d) Economically active persons total figures and as a percentage of whole population**

<i>Africans</i>	<i>Coloureds</i>	<i>Asians</i>	<i>Whites</i>
6,389,000	807,000	208,000	1,673,000
(70,4%)	(8,9%)	(2,3%)	(18,4%)

Source: Minister of Statistics based on estimates for June 1974, Hansard 6, Col. 4()0, 9 September 1974.

**(e) Distribution of Africans in 'White' areas**

<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>
4,614,649	3,446,124

Source: Bulletin of Statistics, December 1974, Department of Statistics, Pretoria.  
Estimates based on 1970 Census.

**(f) Growth of wage-gap in Rand per annum - excluding agriculture, domestic service & railways**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Africans</i>	<i>Gap</i>
1969	2,874	439	2,435
1970	3,213	472	2,741
1971	3,555	519	3,036
1972	3,824	578	3,246

Source: Bulletin of Statistics, March 1974, Department of Statistics, Pretoria.  
(If above categories were included, the gap would be considerably bigger.)

## 1 The Answer to Minority Rule

In a world increasingly hostile to race-based oligarchy, South Africa works unceasingly to widen its circle of accomplices. Its public relations machine orchestrates a perpetual wail on the theme 'why pick on us?'. It continually seeks admiration for its (often inaccurate) statistics on the incomes of its black inhabitants compared with the incomes of Africans living in areas of minimal resources and development.\* It seizes upon every race riot, every famine, every exposure of intensive wage exploitation elsewhere in the hope that its own conduct will be judged by the lowest common denominator of human misery.

*\*In any case recent statistics show that the income of Africans in South Africa (by far the richest country on the continent) is only the 13th highest in Africa. The average per capita income of Africans in South Africa is R135. In Zambia, for example, it is R231. For the 7 million Africans in the homelands South Africa is near the bottom of the scale with an average per capita income of R72, of which half is earned in migrant workers' wages (Professor Jan Sadie, Dept. of Economics, University of Stellenbosch, quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 5 February 1975). South Africa's white population (just under 20% of the total) receives 76-5% of the country's gross domestic product (Rand Daily Mail, 9 August 1974).*

As a self-proclaimed 'bastion against Communism' South Africa claims an honoured place in the so-called 'free world' and finds it incomprehensible that in some respects (e.g. arms) even its friends and true allies can give it succour only by behaving like thieves in the night. It seeks acclaim for its terror-sanctioned stability by contrasting itself with the social disequilibrium in some areas of the Third World where newly-freed men are groping to lay a foundation for their future, while still contending with a historical heritage of colonial plunder and with continuing imperial interference.

But then the truth about apartheid has long been thoroughly and widely documented. Figures are easily available to show that there is no country on earth in which the ethnic origin alone of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants condemns them to enjoy so trivial a proportion of its national riches. *This* surely is the test; not the unending stream of comparative statistics which pours forth from Pretoria.

And the ethical or moral qualities of apartheid are no more open to debate than the merits or demerits of Nazi race practices. For those who live apartheid's reality) not in debate but in their daily experience, the need to destroy it in all its manifestations is a self-evident truth. That is the starting point and the only remaining question is - how?

On this question the radical opposition movement within South Africa speaks with one voice: it is only through extralegal mass action including armed struggle that the

white monolith can be shifted and a just society won. The African National Congress's 'Strategy and Tactics' states:

South Africa was conquered by force and is today ruled by force. At moments when white autocracy feels itself threatened, it does not hesitate to use the gun. When the gun is not in use, legal and administrative terror, fear, social and economic pressures, complacency and confusion generated by propaganda and 'education' are the devices brought into play in an attempt to harness the people's opposition. Behind these devices hovers force. Whether in reserve or in actual employment, force is ever-present and this has been so ever since the white man came to Africa.<sup>1</sup>

The illusion of the liberal gradualists, that apartheid will die a natural (albeit slow) death by the operation of the economic processes, has been demonstrably shattered by the events of the last three decades. This most dramatic period of economic advance, during which more and more Africans have been sucked into the modern industrial sector, has in fact been accompanied by a widening of the gulf between the races, by greater and not less repression, and by a growing gap between white and black incomes.

Before the Second World War, when South Africa was still on the threshold of its economic leap forward, the civic rights enjoyed by the black majority were paltry enough. They could by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as a suitable mechanism for achieving real change by constitutional methods. But since then, the little that had lingered on from the brave days of Cape liberalism has been systematically eroded. The Westminster-sanctioned compromise in 1909 between the all-white colonial governments in South Africa went the way of all compromises in which the victim is an unrepresented and powerless object of bargaining. The few Africans who had retained their place as electors on the Cape Common Roll were later segregated on a separate voters' roll, with three whites to represent them in the central legislature: only to have even this concession abolished - through a constitutional fraud - by the present regime.

The right to combine in political association across the colour line or on a platform of majority rule is no more. The outlawing of organizations such as the African National Congress, South African Communist Party, and Pan-Africanist Congress has been followed by a mass of draconian judicial and administrative measures to make effectual legal opposition impossible, and to harass and intimidate the voteless majority. What remained to blacks of the right to strike; marginal rights to freehold property in 87% of the national land area; the right to maintain a domicile in the urban complexes; the right to intimacy across the colour line; the right to study at the 'open' universities: these have all been diminished to the point of meaninglessness or simply swept away since 1948.

Indeed, if events in the post-war period prove anything, it is that the more dependent the white establishment becomes on black sweat and black skill, the more jealous it becomes of its monopoly over economic and political privileges, and the more finely it sharpens those instruments which ensure its hegemony.

To take issue with this generalization on the ground that it ignores the new 'liberalism' which post-Verwoerdian apartheid has been recently projecting, is to dispute not so much the fact as the yardstick for measuring its significance. If the essence of apartheid were only the segregated park bench, the all-white playing fields, the Verwoerdian language of 'baaskap', the permanent bar against black mobility into higher skilled occupations, and the refusal to delegate bureaucratic function, then we are indeed witnessing signs (however minimal) of a retreat. Official organs of the ruling parry now join the 'unpatriotic' English press in making disparaging noises about 'petty apartheid'. Government Ministers belonging to the so-called enlightened (*Verligte*) faction talk about making the lot of the African urban dweller 'as happy as possible' and dismiss the idea that the homelands are 'dumping grounds for people we don't want in South Africa'.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, when Mr R. F. Botha, South Africa's chief delegate to the Security Council, told the United Nations in October 1974 that 'My Government does not condone discrimination purely on the grounds of race or colour, and we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on colour',<sup>3</sup> he seemed to have come a very long way from Strijdom's arrogant threat to the same body in 1950 that the Whites 'shall fight to the last drop of our blood to maintain white supremacy in South Africa'.<sup>4</sup>

But those who see in all this a significant indicator of a move from the top for the redistribution of power in favour of a society based on equality, confuse the politician's rhetoric with the reality which it hides. They ignore the fundamental premise from which all elements (whether *Verligte* or *Verkrampste*) in the regime proceed. What separates a Strijdom and a Botha is not a retreat from white supremacy but rather a differing approach to securing that supremacy in two distinct periods: a period when the risks of internal upheaval and external pressures were not yet immediately menacing; and the present period, when the prospect of a black revolutionary breakthrough is no longer a distant nightmare but a discernible cloud on the horizon, and the mood among the blacks inside the country and along the Republic's increasingly exposed borders is one of growing national assertiveness.

The significance of the reforms which have already been conceded and those which may still come, and their relevance to the struggle equation, will be referred to again. At this point it is enough to say that the pragmatism of the Vorster variety is little more than a tactical redisposition calculated to streamline apartheid's machinery and to fortify the main citadel of white control in a situation which, according to de Villiers Graaff, leader of the opposition United Party, 'has dramatically reduced both the time and the space which stands between us and the relentless approach of insurgency towards South Africa itself'.<sup>5</sup>

To understand the true meaning of the reforms which have already been made and those which are still promised, it is essential that we recognize the point beyond which South Africa will not and cannot go.

First, white South Africa (if it is to survive as such) will not and cannot allow a challenge to the claim which it lays to ownership and control of the wealth in 87% of South Africa's land area. Its new-found vigour in promoting so-called black 'self-government' in the remaining 13% is designed to legitimize this monstrous historical swindle. Neither is the political kingdom negotiable except for the trappings of office in South Africa's backyards which are being graced by the name of 'homelands' or 'Bantustans'. For those - the majority of the black people - who are forced in their lifetime to minister to the labour needs of the urban complexes and rich farmlands where most of them were born, there is no question of the vote or any other constitutional access to real power. What has always united and continues to unite all white South Africans (except, in the words of General Smuts, 'those who are quite mad')<sup>6</sup> is the absolute and perpetual bar to political power-sharing in what is claimed to be 'white South Africa'.

'Call it paramountcy, baaskap or what you will,' said Strijdom,

'it is still domination. I am being as blunt as I can. I am making no excuses. Either the white man dominates or the black man takes over. The only way the European can maintain supremacy is by domination. And the only way they can maintain domination is by withholding the vote from the non-European. If it were not for that we would not be here in Parliament today.'

<sup>7</sup>

Such refreshing candour is no longer the fashion. The word 'paramountcy' is now seldom heard, and 'baaskap' is reserved for election time in the rural areas. But 'what you will' is very much alive, except that it attempts to hide its parentage so as to gain social acceptance.

White South Africa's exclusive control over South Africa's riches is even less on offer. \* Ninety-nine per cent of these are to be found in that part of South Africa which apartheid 'scholars' claim to be the white man's 'natural heritage'. *This racial monopoly over all the essential means of production is the real source of white political dictatorship.* And, in turn, exclusive control of the state apparatus sanctifies and maintains the vast racial imbalance by which South Africa's wealth is appropriated.

\* *'White South Africa' is in fact overwhelmingly black. It is white only in relation to access to wealth and power.*

'In our country,' say the ANC,

'more than in any other part of the oppressed world, it is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without a return of the wealth of the land to the people as a whole. It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that

victory must embrace more than formal political democracy. To allow the existing economic forces to retain their interests intact is to feed the root of racial supremacy and does not represent even a shadow of liberation.’<sup>8</sup>

All that the recent signs of so-called enlightenment can be said with confidence to reflect is the system's ability to accommodate itself to internal and world pressures in those areas not crucial to its fundamental patterns of domination. At most we might dare to suggest that the observable back-peddalling at secondary levels of the system, accompanied by division and infighting in the ranks of the oligarchy on the pace of the ‘reforms’, is some evidence of a ferment within apartheid which renders it more vulnerable to revolutionary assault. As stated by Dr Yusuf Dadoo:

From the point of view of the people, even the small successes such as the recent meagre wage rises create rising expectations and have given them new experience of the potential of united action on a much bigger scale. The forced retreat by the government on the question of certain levels of skilled work for blacks provides a spur for greater achievement in this field and highlights still further in the minds of the African Workers the iniquitous wage gap between them and the whites who previously carried out the same work. The new deceptive labour law places more firmly on the agenda the urgent need to struggle for real trade union rights and the right to strike. Although it was never the regime's intention, the speeding up of the Bantustan programme has put on the agenda as never before the whole question of real political power and national liberation.

Those, then, who maintain that a substantial shift in political power could eventually come through changes by and within the system can only base their prophecy on the faith that the South African ruling class will set a precedent in history and abandon the real source of its power without a fight.

No system can survive without a legitimizing ideology which mobilizes its own battalions and blunts the aspirations of its opponents or accommodates these by deflecting them into channels which bypass the main issues. There are, of course, moments when, feeling itself vulnerable, the ruling class is compelled to venture into new territory, and so unintentionally triggers off fresh energies in its antagonists. But at the end of the day it will muster all its instruments of force to destroy these energies or divert them into non-vital areas.

So, whatever else may happen, the South African ruling class will not give up the main heights it commands without an intense struggle. It is precisely to prevent the threatened assault on these heights that adjustments are being made on fronts of secondary importance and more substance is being given to the Bantustan schemes.\* And it is for the same reason that more action can be expected to remove or alleviate those levels of racial humiliation which are not indispensably functional to the system. The regime hopes in this way to gain black collaboration or acquiescence inside and

general support outside South Africa for its more fundamental purposes. It is a measure of the changed chemistry of the situation (inside South Africa, on its immediate borders and in the world generally) that apartheid realizes how necessary such collaboration is, if doom is to be postponed.

\*Ironically the apartheid publicists claim that the homelands scheme is an earnest of their sincerity in moving towards 'decolonization' and ending race discrimination. But like Humpty Dumpty in *Alice*, they are past masters at making a word mean 'just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less'. Limited Indian representation in parliament (provided for in a 1946 statute but never implemented) was abolished by the *Indian Representation Act* of 1948. The pass laws were extended to women and to some previously exempted men in the Cape Province by the *Abolition of Passes Act* in 1952 (under this Act the annual rate of pass law arrests reached new heights). The meagre indirect representation of Africans (by three whites) in the central parliament was ended by the *Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act* of 1959. In the same year the right of blacks to attend white universities was ended by the *Extension of University Education Act*. And joint political organization across the colour line was interfered with by the *Prohibition of Political Interference Act*, 1968.

Even some good friends of the black liberation movements are sometimes tempted to allow a celebration of apartheid's reforms to weaken their moral and practical hostility towards it, and to foster the illusion that there may be a route to true democracy in South Africa short of the complete destruction of the white state and the economic base on which it rests. But the new society in South Africa will only come through a successful revolutionary assault by the deprived, in which increasing armed confrontation is unavoidable. To counsel otherwise is in fact to counsel submission.

A war in South Africa will doubtless bring about enormous human suffering. It may also, in its initial stages, see a line-up in which the main antagonists fall broadly into racial camps, and this would add a further tragic dimension to the conflict. Indeed if a reasonable prospect existed of a powerful enough group amongst the Whites joining in the foreseeable future with those who stand for majority rule, the case for revolt would be less compelling. As it is, the ANC claims that,

The laager-minded white group as a whole moves more and more in the direction of a common defence of what is considered a common fate ... this confrontation on the lines of colour - at least in the early stages of the conflict - is not of our choosing; it is of the enemy's making. It will not be easy to eliminate some of the more tragic consequences.<sup>10</sup>

There are those who argue that the consequences of such a conflict - tragic not only for both peoples but because it might well encourage outside forces to take sides on racial lines - are sufficient reasons in themselves to outweigh the passion for immediate radical change. But they are inventing for the black people of South Africa a code of



social morality which no people in such conditions have ever accepted. To the black ear such reasoning has an especially hypocritical ring when it comes from editorial writers in Europe whose countries, in this century alone, have given the lives of scores of millions of their youth to ward off or destroy what they conceived to be tyranny. They would certainly endorse the spirit of Gladstone's remarks about Britain when he said: 'If the people of this country had obeyed the precept to eschew violence and maintain order, the liberties of this country would never have been obtained.'<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, a commitment to violence cannot be grounded on a speculation that the alternative would take a little longer. The path to which South Africa's national liberation movement is committed is not one which it has selected from a group of viable alternatives. There *is* no other path to the winning of majority rule over the whole of South Africa, for the simple reason that all other routes are permanently barred.

Yet one may concede all this and still continue to question the liberation movement's commitment to the strategy of revolutionary force. This may be done from one of two positions. Either (like some of the Bantustan leaders) one may dismiss the feasibility of victorious violent resistance in the context of such a vast imbalance of power and resources between the antagonists (an argument which will be considered later); or one may maintain that enlightened pressures from within the white group (although minimal at present) will escalate, and in the foreseeable future create conditions for a less painful road to democratic advance. In support of this hope, one cannot point to the adjustments which have already taken place; for this would be to overlook their peripheral and defensive nature and to ignore the factors which triggered them off.

When the white opposition leader voices the well-worn cliché of counter-insurgency that 'the only way to win the war against insurgency is to create conditions in which it could not take root',<sup>12</sup> he pays tribute to the impact which even the threat of force is making on the thinking of the white establishment. This kind of thinking (echoed by Nationalist politicians, army men and others), the ever-so-slight breeze of change suggested in the Progressive Party gains in the 1974 election, and in the marginal reforms which are being floated, underscore not growing white enlightenment, but the imperative relevance of the language of force. Dilute this language, and Vorster's so-called 'voice of reason' will become correspondingly less audible. Translate it into a sustained confrontation, and conditions may well emerge in which white intransigence on the main issues is forced to weaken, and talk of dialogue may no longer be a prescription for surrender.

Until then the seeds of revolt will continue to find nourishment, and no amount of surgery to remove 'unnecessary irritating laws' will prevent their germination. It is those laws and institutions that are considered 'necessary' to maintain white domination which count, and not the peripheral reforms which are both a response to the threat of force and, hopefully for Vorster, a defence against it. To create conditions in which insurgency cannot take root in the South African context means nothing less

than to set the stage for an immediate advance towards majority rule. And this can only be brought about from a position of revolutionary strength and not supplication.

The inclusion of armed activity in the political struggle has not always been part of the strategy of South Africa's liberation movements, even though the dislodging of white supremacy in South Africa was never possible without it. Its adoption in the early sixties represented a departure from previous tactics (the significance of the change will be dealt with in Chapter 4). But let it be emphasized at the outset that in discussing revolutionary violence, the South African movement is not playing at war games. Insurgency in the context of a popular liberation struggle is not merely a confrontation between two bodies of armed combatants; if this were the case no guerrilla force could, in the long term, match the professional armed might of the modern state. Its ability to commence military operations, to sustain itself and eventually to create an all-round climate of collapse in which a direct political solution becomes possible, is not the function of military tactics alone; it is dependent upon a comprehensive political strategy in which the core factor is the mobilization of a popular revolutionary base. Unless the struggle is supported by this base, serves it and is guided by it, it has as dismal a future as an isolated group of bandits would have. Looked at in this light, popular insurgency is a continuation of the political struggle by means which include armed actions.

Although the introduction of force influences every other level of political endeavour, it is nevertheless political and not military leadership that must remain supreme. For this to be so, there must be a unified political movement with a common understanding of the main perspectives and the tasks which flow from them at every given stage of the conflict: in other words, a movement which embraces a theory of revolution which is not just an academic exercise in social analysis but provides correct guidelines for action.

The starting point of our analysis and our assessments of the future perspectives must, therefore, be the theory of the South African revolution. This must be firmly rooted in the economic, political and historical peculiarities of the South African situation. But at the same time, if it is to dig beneath appearances and beyond the over-simplified race equation, such a theory must also draw on the treasure house of those fundamental propositions of Marxism which have a universal relevance, and on the experience of revolutionary forces which have fought other battles - both successful and unsuccessful - for radical change. The accumulated wisdom of revolutionary theory and experience is relevant to every part of the world; the accusation that Marxism is 'foreign ideology' is an attempt by a ruling class to put parochial blinkers on a subject people.

In attempting to discuss and elaborate the ideological framework of the South African revolution, I am certainly not venturing into virgin territory. South Africa is the home of two political organizations, the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, which pioneered working-class and national movements on the African continent. Both have behind them a long history of struggle (much of it in

conditions of illegality) in the course of which they have accumulated a wealth of revolutionary theory and practice. The one, the ANC, is the main constituent of the liberation front in its quest for immediate majority rule. Founded in 1912, it is a national mass movement representing the African people in whom it has helped to develop a common consciousness and a feeling of oneness in the face of earlier tribal sectarianisms which made piecemeal conquest so much easier. The other, founded in 1921, represents the aspirations of the working class and aims for the eventual establishment of a socialist South Africa.

Thus the two most important determinants in the South African socio-economic structure - class and race - have given birth to two complementary streams of revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary organization, each influencing the other and often standing in alliance on those aims they share in common. It is appropriate to begin our more detailed examination of the theory of the South African revolution with the complex interplay of race and class and its consequences for the perspectives of future struggle.

## Footnotes

### ***Chapter 1: The Answer to Minority Rule***

1. 'Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress': adopted by the Third Consultative Conference of the African National Congress in April 1969 at Morogoro, Tanzania. The Conference was attended by over seventy delegates and included about a dozen delegates selected by the ANC Executive by virtue of their connection with the allied organization - South African Indian Congress, South African Congress of Trade Unions, Coloured People's Congress, and the South African Communist Party. Published in *Sechaba*, 3 July 1969.
2. Punt Jansen, Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, quoted in the *Rand Daily Mail*, 10 August 1973.
3. *The Times*, 8 October 1974.
4. Karel Roskam, *Inter-Racial Relationships in the Union of South Africa*, Leiden, p. 111.
5. House of Assembly speech, quoted in the *Rand Daily Mail*, 31 August 1974.
6. House of Assembly speech quoted in Roskam, op. cit., p. 94.
7. H. J. May, *The South African Constitution*, Allen and Unwin, 1955, p. 153.
8. 'Strategy and Tactics', (ANC), op. cit.
9. Report to a Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party, *African Communist*, 1st Quarter 1974, p. 32.
10. 'Strategy and Tactics', (ANC), op. cit.
11. Quoted by Harold J. Laski, 6th Roy Calvert Memorial Lecture, 1940.
12. *Rand Daily Mail*, 31 August 1974.

## 2 The Theory of the South African Revolution

South Africa's white and black groups are not homogeneous and within each there are varying kinds of class differentiation. Only a small minority of Whites owns and controls the country's basic means of production. Although the law and state-backed practice ensure that all Whites enjoy the processes of dominance, this does not mean that they all share equally in its fruits. Yet the programmatic and agitational documents of South Africa's revolutionary movement abound in such generalized expressions as 'white power', 'white domination' and 'white supremacy'.

These expressions reflect the immediately perceived reality that in such important spheres as political and civil rights, job access, or ownership and control of the means of production, it is colour and colour alone which, in law, lays down barriers against all Blacks. To be born white means by definition to be born privileged, and to be born black correspondingly deprived. To those actually engaged in revolutionary practice, it is obvious that the immediate struggle is for black liberation.

Yet for all the overt signs of race as the mechanism of domination, the legal and institutional domination of the white minority over the black majority has its origins in, and is perpetuated by economic exploitation. This exploitation, in the contemporary period, serves the interests primarily of South Africa's all-white bourgeoisie, which is in turn linked to international capital. Since race discrimination is the mechanism of this exploitation functional to it, since it is the *modus operandi* of South African capitalism, the struggle to destroy 'white supremacy' is bound up with the very destruction of capitalism itself. It is this interdependence of national and social liberation which gives the South African revolutionary struggle a distinctive form and shapes the role of the various classes within the dominant and subordinated majority.

The fundamental problem of theory posed by the South African revolution thus revolves around this question of the relationship between national and class struggle. The way this relationship is analysed and understood directly influences the tactical and strategic perspectives of those engaged in the conflict.

### CLASS AND RACE

The continuous thread of South African history is the division of its peoples into dominant and subordinate groups defined primarily by criteria of colour. From the moment that the foreign settlers descended until the present day (class divisions and conflict within the dominant and subordinate groups notwithstanding), the economic, political and social status of individual members of each group has been profoundly influenced by ethnic origin. Explicit provisions in the law and state-

backed social practice have ensured that whilst not every white man is a full member of the ruling class proper, no black man, whatever his economic status, can participate on equal terms with his white equivalent at any level of the social structure.

In each contemporary class category - whether it be capitalist, worker or peasant - the black man is fenced off from his white counterpart by a multitude of state-imposed boundaries. In contrast to most other capitalist societies, the process of class formation has always been inextricably linked with national domination, and extra-economic devices have been used to control and influence class mobility.

But South Africa is clearly a capitalist society. Its socioeconomic structure rests ultimately on class relations of capitalist exploitation in which its race policies are rooted. The question presents itself whether the prime emphasis by every serious revolutionary force on the *national* content of- the conflict is theoretically valid. Is there an irreconcilable contradiction between black consciousness and class consciousness? And what is the true relationship between them? To answer this we need to take a look at the concept of exploitation and class and the form it has assumed in the South African context.

In its strict economic sense, the term exploitation has a distinctive meaning. Under capitalism it describes the process whereby the owners of the means of production extract surplus value from that section of society which possesses no productive property except their capacity to labour. The bonds between workers and the factors which operate to set them apart as a distinct class from all other classes in the struggle for social change are rooted mainly in their common experience of exploitation in t.h.is primary meaning.

Differential wage scales between sections of the working class and even the use of guild mechanisms to protect the upper echelons have relevance to the degree and rate of exploitation but not to its essence, even at the level of what has been called the 'labour aristocracy'. Indeed, it is often the better-situated stratum of the working class which responds to the ideas of socialism more rapidly and easily, even though it is also in this stratum that there emerges a compromising element eager to protect its differential benefits.<sup>1</sup> Ultimately the most significant pointer to common class membership is the place a group occupies in the production relations of a given system of social production, and not the quantum of its earnings.

It follows that the white wage worker in South Africa is also an object of exploitation and could be said to occupy a place similar to that of the Black in the country's economic structure. But even if we accept further that in a class-defined society it is the struggle between historically antagonistic social classes which is the main motor force of social transformation, can we posit for South Africa a classic political confrontation between the working class (black and white) in alliance with the peasantry (black and white) against the capitalist class (black and white)?

To South Africa's revolutionary movement, including that Part of it which is inspired by Marxism, such a perspective in the contemporary scene is a nonsensical one. It is nonsensical because it flows from a mechanical application of the valid 'ideal' model of class struggles to a situation in which the familiar categories of 'class' and exploitation' have not only a general but also a particular connotation, not in form or appearance alone but also in substance.

## WHITE AND BLACK WORKERS

This becomes immediately apparent if we examine the dual nature of the exploitation to which the black worker is subjected. As a *worker* the fruits of his labour are appropriated by the owners of the means of production (which, of course, does not include all the Whites); but in addition, as a *black* worker he has particular disabilities to contend with - disabilities designed by the ruling class to facilitate a more intense rate of exploitation.

His role at the point of production is fixed by law as a category distinct from the rest of the working class. There is an absolute extra-economic bar against his acquiring productive property in the existing preserves of the white group. His relation to the white worker is not just that of the unskilled worker to the labour aristocrat. The white workers constitute an exclusive privileged group, membership of which *is completely* barred to the mass of the black working class by legal and social devices, and which is politically integrated into the ruling class so as to play an active *role* in maximizing the exploitation of the black worker. In such a context it would be pedantic to maintain that the black and white workers are political class brothers. The very fact that it does not seem incongruous to talk of the 'white working class' and the 'black working class' is a recognition that at an important level, both in theory and in practice, the two groups occupy a distinct and colour-defined position in relation to the means of production. Their respective roles in the social organization of labour differ,\* as does the share of the social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it.†

*\*Over half the white workers (700,000 out of 1.27 million in 1970) occupy non-productive roles mainly in the tertiary sectors (civil service, finance, professions, wholesale and retail trade, etc.), and where they are more directly engaged in the production of commodities, it is increasingly in the role of overseers.*

*†The well known definition by Lenin of the word class is: 'Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated by law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labour, and, consequently, by the divisions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it*

*(‘A Great Beginning’, Collected Works, Vol. 29, Lawrence & Wishart, p.421.)*

In other words, the white worker (whose militant class postures earlier this century will be discussed in Chapter 3) is not just a part of an aristocracy of labour which has been corrupted ideologically by some concession from the ruling class: he is, in a sense which has no precedent in any other capitalist country, a part (albeit subordinate) of that ruling class in its broader meaning. Indeed, his economic, political and social interests are objectively served by its survival rather than its destruction. In this sense, white consciousness amongst the white workers is not a false consciousness; it reflects their material interests as a group. Conversely, black awareness amongst the black workers is not inconsistent with class consciousness but is an integral part of it. For these reasons the class struggle, particularly since the early twenties, has undoubtedly also involved antagonistic postures between black and white workers. Perhaps a less high-flown but more profound indicator of this is the familiar language of the factory and shop floor. Here the role of the white wage-earner as part of the exploitative machine is given recognition in the almost mandatory use by the black workers of the word 'baas' or 'master' to address him.

The white worker frequently constitutes a more recalcitrant opponent of African industrial advancement than the employer, particularly in the area of job elevation and differential awards for labour. Militant industrial action by white workers, as in the 1922 white miners' strike, often included an attempt to block African workers' advancement. In practice, principles which are seminal to every trade union movement in the world, such as 'the rate for the job' and 'one united trade union centre', have in the South African context been designed by the white workers to entrench rather than to undermine group inequality and to maximize rather than to minimize exploitation of the black worker.

The organized white trade union movement relies heavily on its considerable political influence with the white establishment to back and even initiate devices such as job reservation and to ensure its privileged trade union status. Even when lip-service is paid to the need for legally recognized African trade unions, it is usually qualified by conditions which would, in practice, make them appendages of the white workers' organizations. When economic pressures force a change in the racial policies relating to skilled and semi-skilled jobs, the shift is strictly a parallel one, and the racial gap in wage differentials is maintained or widened on the initiative of the white workers.\* Between 1960 and 1970 the gap between white and black per capita income had grown from 13:1 to 14:1.<sup>2</sup>

*\*In the mines, for example, the latest wage agreement with the 7,000 white artisans gives them an immediate rise of R100 per month in exchange for allowing Africans to do certain artisan tasks under their supervision. This rise alone is five times the average monthly earnings of the black miner even after the recent increases.*

The special place occupied by the black worker in South Africa's class framework is underlined by the fact that every economic action he takes immediately raises the question of his rights and aspirations not just as a worker but as a worker belonging to an oppressed group. In pressing for simple demands with a purely economic content, he is invariably forced to join issue not only with the boss and the state but more often than not with the organized white workers as well.

Thus, in the case of the black worker, the starting point of political consciousness - the economic struggle - invariably involves a national as well as a class disposition. It is instructive to note that some of the most significant industrial actions by the black workers - the 'bucket strike' of 1917, the mine strike of 1920, the great miners' strike of 1946, and many others - were closely linked with, and in some cases led by, political organizations whose leaders were thereafter prosecuted under laws relating to sedition, subversion and treason.

## **THE RURAL POPULATION**

### *(a) On the white farms*

If the exploitation of the black worker is so intimately bound up with his national status, this factor impinges even more clearly in the case of the black population in the rural areas. For all practical purposes, there are no white peasants or rural labourers. Those on the land are there as capitalist farmers or overseers on their behalf. They have exclusive rights to farm 87% of South Africa's land area; and no Black, whatever his economic status, has the legal right to cultivate this soil except in the employ and for the benefit of the white owner. The diminishing numbers of black squatters on white farms have no proprietary or tenure rights to the land they cultivate. Essentially they are rural labourers obliged to render service to the landowner but whose labour time is paid for partly in kind by the allocation of family small-holdings. All together, there are 3,3 million Africans (including families) on the white-owned farms as squatters or contract wage labourers.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, in the white areas, the process of 'liberating' the black peasant from productive property by conquest and its aftermath is absolutely complete. Here, at any rate, the words 'white man' and 'boss' are absolutely interchangeable.

### *(b) In the Reserves*

In the balance of the land area (13 %), statistics relating to black peasant farmers are difficult to acquire. There are now over 7,000,000 Blacks crowded into these areas. Between 1960 and 1970 alone, 1.6 million were 'repatriated' from 'white South Africa' to the reserves; of whom 1.2 million were squatters or labour tenants on white farms.<sup>4</sup> These have now joined millions of other rural people who have neither land nor any other form of employment. In the Transkei, for example, a recent survey in the Umtata district showed that ninety-five percent of families have much less than the 3,4 hectares of land each: the area regarded as minimally necessary to sustain family life.



In the Ciskei a survey in the late sixties showed that one-third of all families had no arable land at all. In fact, most inhabitants of the Reserves constitute a colonizer's dream: a massive army of landless unemployed, geographically separate from the colonists but ever-available as migrant labourers for use by white industrialists or capitalist farmers. This Reserve system is clearly designed to meet the exploitative needs of the capitalist system and in particular its unending quest to ensure the production and reproduction of cheap labour power.

No reliable figures are available of the extent to which the legally limited land area available to Blacks in the Reserves has become concentrated in the hands of a minority of black peasant families. But there can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority who eke out part of their living from working the land are not commodity producers for the market and fall into the lowest rung of rural economic categories. In other words, insofar as there may be a handful of middle or rich black peasants, they have, *for the moment*, minimal significance as direct economic exploiters, and the class picture in the case of those who have any access to land at all is completely dominated by a poor black peasantry. Their poverty and land-hunger is, even more clearly than in the case of a black worker, connected with their national status. Even conceptually they have no actual or potential white class brothers.

The pursuit of the aspirations of the land-starved peasants and landless unemployed in the Reserves must, in a most immediate sense, bring them into direct political collision with the ruling class as a whole and its state apparatus. Here, there is no intermediate stage of a poor peasants' struggle against landlords and kulaks (as was the case, say, in China or Russia), with localized economic confrontations paving the way towards a wider political consciousness. In South Africa the day-to-day struggle of the black peasants and aspirant peasants as a class is inseparable from their struggle as a subject people. Even localized struggles invariably assume a political form connected with their status as members of a subject group.

## **THE BLACK MIDDLE STRATA**

The African middle strata in the white areas and the paltry few amongst them who have themselves become petty capitalist exploiters are similarly hemmed in by national disabilities which frustrate their aspirations and which, consequently, place them in a hostile position towards their white counterparts. In general the unreliable and vacillating nature of any political commitment by the petit bourgeoisie in capitalist society is legendary: since this class occupies the intermediate area between the mass of the working people and its exploiters. Its members often enter and leave the ranks of the latter of they play the role of appendages of the ruling class, mainly in the tertiary sectors. In the case of the black middle strata, however, class mobility cannot proceed beyond a certain point; and, again, this point is defined in race rather than in economic terms. Objectively speaking, therefore, the immediate fate of the black

middle sections is linked much more with that of the black workers and peasants than with their equivalents across the colour line.\*

*\*I have so far used the word 'Black' to refer mainly to the African people. The 2 million Coloured people and the 1 million Indians are subjected to similar disabilities as groups even though the degree of discrimination and in their case not as far-reaching and intense. It is only amongst the Indian group (the overwhelming majority of whom are workers) that has emerged a sizeable group of commercial bourgeoisie which is, nevertheless barred from using its economic resources to break into the the capitalist structures. In general, the Coloured and Indian people a natural ally of the African masses even though the ruling class often attempts to use their slightly more favourable position to divert them from involvement in the struggle for all-round radical change.*

In the Bantustans, exceptionally, however, there is emerging a significant group of petty capitalists and, in some areas, farming entrepreneurs. Between 1959-60 and 1972-3 the Bantu Investment Corporation (B.I.C.) granted 1,413 loans worth R9,817,755 to African businessmen: eighty-five per cent for commercial enterprises, twelve-and-a-half per cent for service industries and two-and-a-half per cent for other industries. Also by the end of March 1973, the B.I.C. erected 392 business buildings for leasing to African businessmen.<sup>5</sup> In a recent paper presented to a conference on development at the University of the Witwatersrand, the Minister of Agriculture of the Bophuthaswana stated:

It is notable that in recent times a new breed of farming entrepreneur has emerged amongst the Tswana people. It is not uncommon to find farmers running herds of several hundred cattle. Stud breeders have also been forthcoming, and also in the field of crop husbandry, men, owning tractor units and producing up to 6,000 bags of grain per annum are operating on portions of land leased from other farmers or on vacant government land.<sup>6</sup>

If the pattern in other neo-colonial regimes in Africa repeats itself, the new administrative class which is being established to help run the Bantustans can also be expected to use their positions to advance themselves in the economic sphere.

Although they have not yet taken off as a significantly large direct exploiter of their people, the role of these petty capitalists and the bureaucratic elite, as appendages of dependent neo-colonial development, will undoubtedly grow. As a dependent fraction of the white state's dominating classes they will feed on its patronage and, as a group, tend to serve its exploitative designs.\*

*\*See also "A FUTURE BLACK EXPLOITING CLASS?" below.*

## THE MAIN LINE-UP AND SECONDARY CONTRADICTIONS

Class differences and antagonisms within the oppressed groups have a significant bearing on our later remarks on the issue of which class stands in the forefront of the struggle for social change, and of respective roles in relation to the imperative linking of the national with the social revolution. For the moment I have concentrated on what the national liberation movement in South Africa believes to be the valid projection of an objective basis for revolutionary actions by all social groups amongst the Blacks. These, by and large, face an alliance - also rooted in objective economic factors - of all social groups amongst the politically dominant white community.

This projection is based on existing realities and tendencies. But historically there have always been differences within the ruling class centred on competing claims for labour resources and on the reallocation of the surplus generated by the superexploitation of the Blacks.

It is true of the South African ruling class, as of any other, that 'the separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors'.<sup>7</sup>

So, in the early stages of conquest, a complex interplay of competitiveness between rival imperialist powers for the establishment of control over South Africa's natural and labour resources, and conflict at the top within the owning imperialist power, left its impact on the forms devised for domination over the indigenous people. The emergence of a landed settler group and the growth of an indigenous commercial class, led to conflicts with the colonial office on questions such as local labour policy and the pace of forced land grabbing by the wandering Boer communities anxious to free themselves of imperial direction.

The discovery of diamonds and gold gave a fresh impetus to the completion of the colonization process over the whole of what is today South Africa; and (the black wars of resistance aside) this whole period was also punctuated with conflict originating in the contradictions between external imperialist interests and the newly established internal settler states. Looked at from the viewpoint of the close on one million Africans in the Transvaal, the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) was an anti-imperialist struggle only in an extremely technical and qualified sense. To their ears the characterization of Kruger's campaign as a progressive anti-colonial war must have sounded very odd indeed, for they were living in a semi-feudal state whose rigidly enforced constitution, after acknowledging its authority from the Almighty (who is also, by the way, the acknowledged inspirer of the current South Africa Act), proclaimed that there shall be no equality between Black and White in church and State.

The later period which eventually culminated in a political handover to white local interests is also not free of internecine conflict within the ruling class, based largely on

competing claims over the utilization of black labour resources and the reallocation of the surplus. Farming interests versus mining labour needs; mining labour needs versus the labour needs of the emerging secondary industry; the struggle by white workers to entrench their monopoly of skills and privileged status; the attempts by Afrikaner capital to win a place at the top dominated for so long by the English: all these factors, together with the changes that were taking place in the socio-economic structure as a whole, have an important bearing on the shifts in emphasis which have taken place at the level of state policy over the years and the ideological infighting between different sectors of the ruling class.

The movement from the policy of segregation to that of apartheid is partly connected with these interactions. It is also the response of the system as a whole to the reduced capacity of the reserve economics as subsidizing wage factors, and to the growing threat (especially after the Second World War) from a black proletariat, whose permanent establishment in the industrial centres the previous policies of segregation had failed to prevent. The political and economic consequences of this failure affected the different segments of the ruling class in different ways.

Industrial capitalists benefited economically from the growth of a settled urban proletariat, whereas farming capital saw a threat to its supply of cheap migratory labour. Mining capital had a schizophrenic approach stemming from the duality of its interests. On the one hand, the mining industry itself profited greatly from the system of migratory labour, for whose pattern it was chiefly responsible. On the other hand, its steady advance into industrial and finance capital gave it a stake also in the establishment of a more permanent work force in the industrial centres. Perhaps this is a partial explanation of the fact that during the late forties and thereafter, quite a few of the mining magnates who were involved in white politics tended to favour the greater stabilization of the labour force in the towns. To cope with mining labour needs, the industry sought external supplies, which by the fifties constituted seventy-five per cent of its labour force.

With the passage of time, the closer interlocking between mining industrial finance and even farming capital as a result of monopoly trends has lessened some of the contradictions between the previously separate elements of capital, and this perhaps explains the decline of sharp political opposition to the regime from within the white camp.\* The white working class, too, determined as always to perpetuate its monopoly of skills and privileged status, turned more and more politically to those who promised to protect it and to 'keep the Kaffir in his place'. Significantly, the ideological roots of modern apartheid are to be found as far back as the middle twenties in the platform of the all-white South African Labour Party,<sup>8</sup> which disappeared after 1948 when the white workers found their aspirations so well served by the new Nationalist regime.

*\* A great deal more research and analytical work needs to be done to determine more precisely the correlation of the roles of the different segments of capital*

*and the way these reflect themselves at the level of ruling-class policy and ideology.*

Nevertheless, those divisions which persist in the ruling establishment - and some of them now also stem from differences on how to respond to the growing threat from the liberation movements and its external allies - have obvious tactical relevance because they weaken the cohesion of the ruling class and make it possible for the liberation movement to isolate the most racist elements amongst them. So far, however, the dominant tendency has been for the white political and economic oligarchy and its allies to close ranks when faced with a real threat from the majority deprived of rights.

But future developments could alter the relatively monolithic character of the present line-up by the ruling class and its allies. A combination of factors - economic crisis, successful pressure from the liberation movements, etc. - may force a break with existing patterns at the top in an attempt to ensure the survival of capitalism. It could, for example, lead to jettisoning some of the institutionalized privileges of the white workers.

Already the labour shortage, reaching crisis proportions in many industrial sectors, has been the main impulse to the present upward mobility of black workers from positions of labourers into semi-skilled and skilled categories. Until now, this has been carried out with the agreement of the white trade unions, which have insisted on the simultaneous elevation of displaced Whites into supervisory and administrative positions. But if, in the long run, the system proves incapable of accommodating the white working class as a whole in this way, those sections which are no longer assured of their racial economic privileges might well become more receptive to class rather than race solidarity. In anticipation of such a possibility, the ANC believes that even now no opportunity should be missed to win over these white workers 'who are ready to break with the policy of racial domination'.<sup>9</sup>

In the light of existing tendencies, however, it is in general unrealistic to expect that any significant group in the dominant white alliance will throw in its lot with the forces struggling for revolutionary change. It does not, however, follow, either theoretically or practically, that there is no place in South Africa's liberation movement for non-Africans either as individuals or as groups. Certainly the 2 million Coloured community and the 1 million Indians are vital and indispensable contingents in a struggle which undoubtedly includes their own liberation as well. In the case of the white community, there is obviously little possibility *at this stage* of winning over a sizeable portion to the side of the liberation movement. But even here it would be doing violence to the basic premise of the liberation movement's policy, that it is fighting to create a non-racial society, if it were not to welcome those few amongst the Whites who show a readiness to break with race-infected rule and unconditionally make common cause with the struggle for full liberation.

The weakness of the slogan of POQO (We Alone), which dominated the thinking of the breakaway Pan-Africanist Congress group in 1958, is thus exposed. An emotional and apolitical cry, it is objectively liable to alienate vital potential allies in the struggle and to make it easier for the enemy to win them over as opponents of the liberation thrust. It ignores the very kernel of the art of political leadership, which demands in the first place the widest possible yoking of actual and potential allies, and the exploitation of division and weakness within the enemy camp; without, of course, compromising the main direction of the struggle. An emphasis on the liberation of the African people does not therefore imply a line-up of the Africans against the rest. In addition, the tactics of the liberation struggle demand that advantage must be taken

of differences and divisions which our successes will inevitably spark off to isolate the most vociferous, the most uncompromising and the most reactionary elements amongst the whites. Our policy must continually stress in the future (as it has in the past) that there is room in South Africa for all who live in it but only on the basis of absolute democracy.<sup>10</sup>

But it remains true that for the moment the mainspring of the conflict is black liberation, with the African majority as the main force. It involves amongst other things a stimulation and deepening of their national confidence, national pride and national assertiveness. A response to national oppression is undoubtedly the chief mobilizing factor. It has over-riding validity at the level of the immediate political struggle and (as we shall show later) has strategic relevance in the struggle for social emancipation as well.

## **THE THEORY OF INTERNAL COLONIALISM**

A revolutionary theory has relevance only as an instrument of social change. To perform this role it must give pride of place to uncovering the real correlation of class and national forces and the mobilizing factors which will set in motion groups who, by their nature, will be historically compelled to destroy South Africa's exploitative system. The overall characteristics of this system have been described by South Africa's revolutionary movement as Internal Colonialism. It is based on the historical analogy of the classic imperialist-colonialist situation in which the ruling class of the dominant nation 'owns' and controls the colonial territory, and uses its instruments of force to maintain its economic, political and military supremacy against any would-be external competitors. All are agreed that in such a situation the elimination of direct foreign control is item one on the agenda of the struggle.

But analogies are not carbon copies; they are resemblances between situations otherwise different. For this case, it is immediately apparent that although South Africa is by no means free of external imperialist involvement, economic control and political supremacy are in general now exercised by an indigenous ruling class with a unitary

state which purports to represent the general will of all the inhabitants. Broadly speaking, its peoples are geographically and in every other way part of a single socio-economic formation, divided along class lines; although they occupy distinct racial positions in relation to the manner in which the wealth is appropriated and in the political structure. That formation is now capitalist in essence, even though some specific marks remain from its historical genesis which involved not only the almost total destruction of the precapitalist mode of production which the settler found amongst the indigenous people, but also the re-structuring of this mode to serve the dominant capitalist production relations.

If then the overwhelmingly dominant mode of production within this unitary state is capitalist, is it analytically correct or useful to talk of 'two South Africas' defined, *at a certain level*, in national rather than class terms? Both the SACP's Programme and the ANC's 'Strategy and Tactics' do precisely this.

The SACP Programme says, under the chapter heading 'Colonialism of a Special Type':

On one level, that of 'white South Africa', there are all the features of an advanced capitalist state in its final stage of imperialism. There are highly developed industrial monopolies and the merging of industrial and finance capital. The land is farmed along capitalist lines, employing wage, labour, and producing cash crops for the local [and] export market. The South African monopoly capitalists, who are closely linked with British, United States and other foreign imperialist interests, export capital abroad especially in Africa. Greedy for expansion, South African imperialism reaches out to incorporate other territories - South West Africa and the Protectorates.

But on another level, that of 'non-white South Africa', there are all the features of a colony. The indigenous population is subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation, lack of all democratic rights and political domination by a group which does everything it can to emphasise and perpetuate its alien 'European' character.<sup>11</sup>

And the ANC's 'Strategy and Tactics' says:

South Africa's social and economic structure and the relationships which it generates are perhaps unique. It is not a colony, yet it has, in regard to the overwhelming majority of its people, most of the features of the classical colonial structures. Conquest and domination by an alien people, a system of discrimination and exploitation based on race, techniques of indirect rule; these and more are the traditional trappings of the classical colonial framework. Whilst at one level, it is an independent national state, at another level it is a country subjugated by a minority race. What makes the structure unique and adds to its complexity is that the exploiting nation is not, as in the typical

imperialist relationship, situated in a geographically distinct mother country but is settled within its border. What is more, the roots of the dominant nation have been embedded in our country for more than three centuries of presence. It is thus an alien body only in the historical sense.

This characterization provides the theoretical foundation for the conclusion that the main content of the *immediate* struggle for change is the national liberation of the African people and, with it, the destruction of all forms of racial discrimination.

Neither in its classical connotations nor in its very specialized use (Colonialism of a Special Type) in the South African context, does the word 'colonialism' necessarily imply that there exist two homogeneous and undifferentiated nations standing in a simple oppressed-oppressor relationship. In both situations the relations of exploitation and domination have their ultimate roots in class exploitation. Even in a more typical anti-imperialist struggle, as in pre-1948 India, the emphasis on British oppression of the Indian people did not preclude a recognition of the class divisions in British society nor the different commitments and roles of the various classes in Indian society in the anti-imperialist movement.

In South Africa the thesis of internal colonialism sees class relations in an historically specific context in which internal group domination has lent shape to, and influenced the content of the exploitative processes. The thesis, however, stresses the existence of internal class divisions in both the dominant and subject groups, with these class divisions influencing political and ideological positions in the struggle for social change. To identify 'white South Africa' with an imperialist state and 'non-white South Africa' with the 'colony' is undoubtedly a useful shorthand, *at one level*, to depict the reality of the historically specific race factor in - both the genesis and the existing nature of class rule.

In this respect there is no great divide between the period when South Africa was a colony in the classical mould, ruled from London with the help of the white settler, and the time when the white settler won autonomy and then political independence. In the latter period a dominant oligarchy restricted to white settlers assumed more and more of the functions of the British ruling class towards the black majority whose subject and colonial status as a group dominated the whole subsequent process of class formation, class mobility and class exploitation. Of course, the whole character of the socio-economic structure has altered fundamentally. But exploitation of the Blacks as a group and the racist ideology which this has spawned are not functions of latter-day monopoly capitalism only. This has been a pattern of exploitative relations from the early days of slavery at the Cape, in the period of primitive capital accumulation and during the phase of commercial and pre-monopoly capitalism.\* It would be pedantic to argue that the colonial status of the black majority disappeared in 1910 or with the granting of Dominion Status by the Statutes of Westminster in 1934, even though there was a shift towards internal political sovereignty. The ruling and



exploitative establishment has always been drawn from the dominant white group (either local or foreign), and the Blacks as a group have always had a subject or colonial status. This reality in its altered form remains the pattern today.

*\*This is not to say that the content of economic exploitation has remained unchanged since the days of slavery. I am dealing here with one of the common threads to emphasize the historical continuity of national domination in the different stages of socio-economic developments.*

## **FROM INTERNAL COLONIALISM TO NEO-COLONIALISM**

Indeed this continuing pattern has provided the impetus for the new administrative procedures we see being established in the nine separate 'homelands' carved out of the Reserves. The main function of the Reserve system was to ensure the reproduction of black labour power within the traditional subsistence economy which the ruling class, from time to time, re-structured to serve its changing needs. This ensured a continuous supply of cheap migratory labour which could be easily dealt with in the political sphere; and, at the same time, provided the rationale for below-minimum-wage levels. What remained of the subsistence economy based on tribal and family units of production purported to serve as indirect wages generated outside the capitalist framework; and to provide some kind of 'social security' when age, sickness or surfeit of labour needs made the presence of the African workers in the white industrial areas economically 'redundant'.

In unguarded moments the real function of the Reserve system has been made crudely obvious: as, for example, in the Chamber of Mines evidence placed before the Lansdowne Commission on Mine Wages in 1943:

It (the Reserves policy) aims at the preservation of the economic and social structure of the native people in the native areas where that structure can be sheltered and developed. The policy is a coherent whole, and is the antithesis of a policy of assimilation and the encouragement of a black proletariat in the towns divorced from its tribal heritage. The ability of the mines to maintain their native labour force by means of tribal natives from the Reserves *at rates of pay which are adequate for this migratory class of native but inadequate for the detribalized native is a fundamental factor in the economy of the gold mining industry.* (my emphasis).<sup>12</sup>

The maintenance of separate geographic areas for the subordinate majority has always constituted an important part of the specific internal colonialist relationship which characterized the socio-economic structure in both its pre-monopoly and monopoly phases. But with the completion, of the conquest, the Reserves system, pioneered by Shepstone in the 1850s to ensure cheap labour supplies to the settler farmers, became an integral part of the unitary state structure established in 1910. Currently there

appears to be a real move to institutionalize the Reserve system into a group of tribal states which, so it is claimed, will soon enjoy full political sovereignty within their areas.

What general purpose is the re-structured Reserve system designed to meet and how will it alter the relationships of internal colonialism? In brief, *it is an attempt partially to externalize the colonial relationship in the shape of ethnic states*, eventually having all the attributes of *formal* political independence.

In other words, the ruling class is, under pressure, searching for a neo-colonial solution especially adapted to South African conditions. It is unable to follow precisely in the footsteps of the main imperialist powers who, when faced with anti-colonial pressures, were able to concede a measure of national-political sovereignty to their colonies whilst contriving to keep intact their economic dominion.

Unlike the classical imperialist rulers, it cannot 'withdraw' to its real power base in some distant metropolis, after a negotiated handover to a submissive bureaucratic elite. It is unable to hold out anything to the colonial subject except neo--colonial office and a few small-scale business opportunities in the scattered rural backwaters. Hence, its own brand of neo-colonialism can operate only on the basis of a *politically* fragmented South Africa. This, if successfully pursued, will reintroduce a more typical content to the colonial relationship and provide a new institutional 'justification' for the absolute bar to black political advancement in 'white' South Africa. It would obviously facilitate the piecemeal manipulation and exploitation of the ethnic groups which make up the African people as a totality. Already the Bantustan administrations are competing for foreign and local imperialist investment on the basis of the only commodity that they all have in abundance – 'cheap, problem-free labour'.\* And, hopefully for South Africa's ruling class, it is this kind of labour which will continue to be the main export commodity to service an economy which despite the rhetoric of the apartheid idealists has become more than ever dependent on black workers.

\*Examples of the contents of the investment appeals were referred to in the *Financial Mail*, 11 October 1974, pp. 146-8. "*Stop pussyfooting around. If you want a nice, fat, highly-profitable overseas operation, invest in SA. But make sure you build your factory in a Black area.*" So runs the appeal to foreign investors by Chief Wessels Mota, chief executive councillor of Basotho Qua Qua, in a recent advertisement by the Bantu Investment Corporation in *The Economist*.

'KwaZulu's Gatsha Buthelezi offers "problem-free labour resources", while Lebowa's Cedric Phatudi declares: "The Black proletariat in the Homelands is ready, willing, and able to do a decent day's work for a fair salary.'"

'Just how "fair" are these salaries? A survey by Wits University's Wages Commission earlier this year found, for example, that Kool Look Wigs (Pty), the largest single employer in the Homelands and the first to move there (as

distinct from a border area), was paying unskilled workers a basic wage of R2,50 to R3,25 a week.'

These new steps to transform the Reserve system reflect a policy which is, therefore, in the direct line of succession from the present internal form of colonialism, showing the strains of its lack of sufficient geographic definition. It is an attempt to legitimize the foreign conquest in a new way and to use black 'governments' and administrations to carry out the more important functions of the old 'Native Commissioners'.

This is not to say that we should discount the contradictions which are implicit in this new attempt to hide the real mechanism of race domination. We have already witnessed a measure of sharp verbal infighting between some of the less sycophantic Bantustan leaders and the government on questions like land consolidation and allocation of economic resources. But the implied premise from which these confrontations proceed is an acceptance of the white myth that the indigenous majority has claim only to an ethnic solution on the basis of so-called 'natural homelands' into which the conquest squeezed the fighting tribes, and not to a national one. Some Bantustan leaders (e.g. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu) qualify the acceptance of this myth by an insistence that it is, for the moment, a justifiable temporary compromise warranted by black powerlessness. Nevertheless, even such qualified acceptance is objectively calculated to disarm nationwide revolutionary endeavour on the real issue of immediate majority rule and to replace national consciousness with regional and ethnic consciousness which for obvious reasons, can be more easily manipulated. It serves also to undermine the most significant achievement of the ANC in advancing the 'one nation' concept as opposed to tribal separatism.

## **NATIONAL LIBERATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF CAPITALISM**

True national liberation is impossible without social liberation; and a nationalist ideology which ignores the class basis of racism is false. No doubt the necessary emphasis on the national content of the struggle could, as a by-product, encourage a disregard of its ultimately class basis and with it the emergence of pure bourgeois nationalism, backward racialism and chauvinism. Some recent academic criticisms of the internal colonialist thesis and the national liberation strategy which it suggests have questioned the validity of the thesis on the grounds that it would undervalue (and, some say, already has undervalued) the class factors in the conflict. Insofar as this danger exists it must, of course, be continuously countered by the spread of true revolutionary ideology, and by ensuring that a working class imbued with class and political consciousness plays its proper role in the coalition of forces which constitutes the liberation front. Indeed, both the theory and practice of South Africa's revolutionary movements have emphasized the special role of the working class in the national struggle and the social goals of the liberation struggle.

On the immediate role of the working class in the struggle for national and social liberation, the SACP Programme says, in a paragraph which is printed in emphasis, that only under working class leadership can the 'full aim of the revolution be achieved'. On the nature of South Africa's national struggle, the ANC's 'Strategy and Tactics' says:

The national character of the struggle must therefore dominate our approach. But it is a national struggle which is taking place in a different era and in a different context from those which characterized the early struggles against colonialism. It is happening in a new kind of world - a world which is no longer monopolized by the imperialist world system; a world in which the existence of the powerful socialist system and a significant sector of newly liberated areas has altered the balance of forces; a world in which the horizons liberated from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the elements which make such control meaningful - economic emancipation. It is also happening in a new kind of South Africa; in which there is a large and well-developed working class whose class consciousness and independent expressions of the working people - their political organs and trade unions - are very much part of the liberation front. Thus our nationalism must not be confused with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. *It must not be confused with the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendancy so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the mass. . . (my emphasis).*

This perspective of a speedy progression from formal liberation to genuine and lasting emancipation is made more real by the existence in our country of a large and growing working class whose class consciousness complements national consciousness. Its political organizations and the trade unions have played a fundamental role in shaping and advancing our revolutionary cause.

This special place of the working class within the national movement and the part played by independent working class organizations in a liberation alliance accords an immediate role to class-based action and is an obvious obstacle to any tendency for the national struggle to fall under bourgeois hegemony.

There is objective ground for the belief that 'under South African conditions the national democratic revolution has great prospects of proceeding at once, to socialist solutions'.<sup>13</sup> This follows from the undoubted reality that no significant national demand can be successfully won without the destruction of the existing capitalist structure. It is precisely because in South Africa capitalist production relations are the foundation of national repression that the national struggle itself has an objective coincidence with the elimination of all forms of exploitation. The elimination of national inequality, if it is to be more than a mere gesture, involves a *complete* change of the way in which the country's wealth is appropriated. This must surely be the major premise of every social group or class in the subordinate majority, even if its ideology is

limited solely to an urge for national vindication. This premise bears on the correction of historical injustice stemming from conquest; it is concerned with the fundamental source of existing grievance, and it has vital relevance to the question of future power relationships. If every racist statute were to be repealed tomorrow, leaving the economic status quo undisturbed, 'white domination' in its most essential aspects would remain.

National liberation in its true sense, must therefore imply the expropriation of the owners of the means of production (monopolized by a bourgeoisie drawn from the white group) and the complete destruction of the state which serves them. There can be no half-way house unless the national struggle is stopped in its tracks and is satisfied with the co-option of a small black elite into the presently forbidden areas of economic and political power. For the overwhelming mass, such a result would perpetuate the historic consequences of national conquest. It therefore stands opposed not only to the class aims of the working people but also to the aims of the genuine nationalist to be found in the ranks of other social groups. This explains the relative ease of the progression from national to class political consciousness by so many black South African activists who begin their political life as 'pure' nationalists.

South Africa's ruling class is of course, able to find individual collaborators amongst the black people through the lure of status, more lucrative jobs, etc. But is there a social group within the national movement which will be served by a purely nationalist solution (of the type seen in some parts of Africa), which would keep the existing economic and state structure essentially intact? The destruction of this structure is, at the moment, the factor which gives a common content to the aspirations of all the social groups amongst the black people except, perhaps, those who have a vested interest in Bantustan separatism. It is in this sense that a broadly based assault on white supremacy involves the expropriation of the main contingents of South Africa's oligarchy and its state apparatus; in other words, the destruction of the capitalist system as we know it.

### **A FUTURE BLACK EXPLOITING CLASS?**

Beyond the political chemistry of the existing situation, it is not out of place to speculate about the tendencies within the system which, although not yet dominant, may grow in importance. The contrast between the large and experienced black working class (which, together with the rural landless, forms the overwhelming base for the national struggle) and the relatively undeveloped state of the black bourgeoisie, is an obvious obstacle to the importation of bourgeois ideology into the national movement.

But since group colour domination is, in general, not an indispensable condition for capitalist exploitation, is there a possibility that a capitalist society could still evolve within the present South African framework which jettisons the race factor altogether?

One of the preconditions for such a development would have to be the fostered growth of a black bourgeoisie and its co-option into the ruling class. But I have already argued that the South African ruling class will be compelled by its very nature to resist any incursion into its existing sources of wealth and the state power which underwrites it. *The racial exclusiveness of its economic and political power is a primary and not a secondary feature of the structure as a whole.* Even if it were willing to take some members of the black middle strata into its fold, this could only be in an auxiliary and dependent capacity, without even the consolation (as elsewhere in Africa) of political office. They would be playing a role in the economic sphere similar to that of black policemen in the state apparatus - as collaborators in a continued system of race repression. Such a group can have no place in the national movement of the sort occupied by the small independent national bourgeoisie of the colonies, precisely because its interests would visibly stand in contradiction to those of the people as a whole, even in the context of purely national aims.

At the moment, insofar as we can speak of an African bourgeoisie at all, it is pathetically small and has arrived too late on the historical scene to play a classic class role either as a leading element in the national struggle or as the main beneficiary of mass revolutionary sacrifice. Indeed, for a black bourgeoisie to gain ascendancy, the whole 'normal' process would have to be reversed, in the sense that *its real class formation would have to follow and not precede political power.* Since the aspirations of all the main classes amongst the oppressed majority can, at the moment, only be served by the destruction of the economic and political power of the existing ruling class, the question which remains is whether the role of the all-white bourgeoisie could conceivably be assumed by a black equivalent *in the future* which would act to stop the revolution in its tracks and subvert the social aims of real national emancipation.

This possibility cannot, of course, be discounted altogether. Within the white group itself, we have seen during the last twenty-five years in particular how the wielding of political power has facilitated the breakthrough of 'Afrikaner capital' into finance and mining; areas previously the preserve of so-called 'English capital'. In some other parts of the continent, too, political office has been used as an instrument by those at the top to enrich themselves through state-backed projects and by providing the necessary local participation in neo-colonialist enterprises.

It is only in the projected neo-colonies (Bantustans) that there are any signs at all of an emerging administrative and, as yet small, commercial class which aspires to greater rights of participation at the top of the exploitative machine than is permitted in 'white' South Africa. Together with the traditional elements, this group is being offered a vested interest in the fragmentation of South Africa, to stifle the national movement as we know it and replace it with ethnic and parochial nationalism.

The eventual creation of these satellite client states, on whose behalf 'development' capital is being canvassed in 'white' South Africa and in the West with the lure of cheap 'problem-free' black labour, is clearly designed by the regime to help perpetuate a newly camouflaged version of race exploitation with black collaboration. However, unlike its counterpart in some parts of Africa, a Bantustan-based commercial and bureaucratic elite is at a disadvantage in any attempts to mobilize the allegiance of the African people as a whole on the basis of a 'solution' which, even at the superficial level (a political takeover), fails to meet their *national* aspirations with regard to South Africa as a whole. Those, therefore, who use their status as aspirant administrators or businessmen to entrench the Bantustans, fall outside the mainstream of the national struggle.

## THE NATURE OF THE NEW STATE

So far we have attempted to describe those factors in the existing class make-up of the African people and its main allies which provide an objective basis for a national struggle, to strike at the existing framework of capitalist exploitation throughout the whole of South Africa. But we need to look further and consider the type of society which will replace it. This is not merely speculation about the future; it bears immediately and directly on the main class content and direction of the struggle, not only for social but also for national emancipation. What then is the revolutionary movement's projection in this respect?

Broad guidelines are provided by the *Freedom Charter* (formulated by the most representative assembly ever held in South Africa, the 1955 Congress of the People, and thereafter endorsed by both the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party), and that section of the SACP's Programme (adopted in 1962) which deals with the national democratic state as the immediate form of the post-revolutionary state in South Africa.

The *Freedom Charter* (an extremely short document - less than 1,500 words) is devoted largely to a description of the type of 'democratic' state sought. It sets out under separate headings the changes which will be necessary in order to eradicate racial discrimination at every level. It calls for the restoration of all South Africa's wealth to the people, which involves the transfer of 'the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry . . . to the ownership of the people'. It cites the need to control the rest of industry and trade 'to assist the well-being of the people' and proclaims that all people 'shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions'. It refers to the ending of 'restrictions on land ownership on a racial basis', and a redivision of the land 'amongst those who work it'.

The SACP Programme, although it states that the *Freedom Charter* is not a programme for socialism but rather 'a common programme for a free, democratic South Africa

agreed on by socialists and non-socialists' pledges the Party's 'unqualified support' for its implementation. It sees the achievement of the aims of the *Freedom Charter* as laying 'the indispensable basis for the advance of our country along non-capitalist lines to a socialist and communist future'. And, it calls for '*a national democratic revolution which will overthrow the colonialist state of white supremacy and establish an independent state of national democracy in South Africa*'.

Some critics of the formulations have concluded that what is implicit in them is an unwarranted duality between the struggle for national and social emancipation, with the latter appearing on the agenda only after the destruction of the race structures by the 'national democratic state'. I have already referred to the interdependence of the struggle against the race structures and the capitalist system which is served by them. There can be little doubt that the implementation of the *Freedom Charter* will in itself be a giant step towards social as well as national emancipation. But clearly a number of phases is envisaged.

It is important to emphasize that the reference to the tasks of 'immediate' and 'future' phases does not necessarily involve a commitment to the step by step creation of two distinct socio-economic formations: first a non-racist bourgeois democracy and then a socialist order. Lenin's theoretical commitment to a bourgeois democratic phase in pre-February Russia was bound up with the slogan of a 'revolutionary democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants' and not that of the bourgeoisie. In fact, the leading role which the workers and peasants played in the 'first phase' (not, by the way, on the slogan of class against class) resulted in a relatively quick development from February to October. The struggle for bourgeois democratic rights at the dawn of capitalism, when it represented mainly the class aims of the emerging bourgeoisie, is to be distinguished from the period when the working class emerges as an independent political force, with the capacity to become the most decisive element in the struggle for democratic changes.

This distinction becomes even more relevant to a situation of the South African type in which the emergence of a significantly large bourgeoisie amongst the subordinate group has been frustrated by the dominant ruling class, and in which the main drive for social change must come from the large black proletariat in alliance with rural labourers and the millions of landless and land-hungry people in the countryside. This is not to say that the main mobilizing slogan at this stage is class against class; nor does it imply that the forces of immediate struggle for a revolutionary breakthrough will necessarily be in a position to proclaim a socialist South Africa at the moment of victory against the racist state.

The problem of creating a socialist order, even where the working class is the dominant force in the newly created state power, is connected with yet another factor. Unlike emerging classes in all previous progressions from one class order to another, the working class does not achieve a measure of control and ownership of productive



property within the old society itself. When it gains political ascendancy as a result of a revolutionary breakthrough, it has no ready-made socialist economic structures which grow within the womb of the old society, in the way that capitalist property and capitalist relations of production evolved over a long period of time within feudalism. The advanced levels of division of labour and of the social organization of production under capitalism, provide a foundation for socialization but do not, in themselves, constitute socialist property. Laying the basis for the construction of a *socialist economic order* is only possible after the achievement of political power. In this sense every contemporary revolution in which the working class has a dominant role, has gone through a series of interim phases before it was able to establish a socialist economic order. Thus there is a distinction between the creation of the new state form and the building of a new socialist economic formation. The former is made possible by a revolutionary seizure of power; the latter through the exercise of that political power by a class whose interests are unconditionally served by a socialist order.

The *Freedom Charter* and the SACP Programme do not, as we have seen, project socialism as the immediate consequence of expropriating the main contingents of the ruling class. A non-monopoly private sector, controlled so as 'to assist the well-being of the people', will still be tolerated. Rural policy involves confiscation, redistribution and redivision of the land amongst the people; *implying an extension of private ownership*. This is qualified by the words 'those who work it'; and in a 1968 commentary on the *Freedom Charter* the thought is added that the land is to be 'divided amongst the small farmers, peasants and landless of all races *who do not exploit the labour of others*'.<sup>15</sup> \*

*\*Whilst it is premature to speculate about future agrarian policy in detail, a literal and mechanical implementation of this land policy would, I believe, unnecessarily proliferate petit-bourgeois and bourgeois aspirations in the rural areas and may create serious economic problems for the country as a whole. A basis certainly already exists for the transformation of the large, rich and mechanized capitalist forms (worked by the millions of black rural proletarians) into communally-run farms. Economic considerations aside, this would also serve to create a relatively advanced rural revolutionary base for the new state.*

It should be emphasized that this projection of a liberated South Africa not yet socialist, is not just a device to provide a basis in the struggle for an alliance of the different social forces amongst the oppressed. It is rather a recognition of the reality that the construction of socialism is a process which is not consummated but begun by a successful revolutionary seizure of power. And during the course of this process a vital role, under restrictive controls, may still be required of a private and (let us not balk at the issue) exploitative sector. This type of interim phase has been experienced by every socialist country, including Russia and China.

All-purpose words or phrases to characterize this kind of presocialist interim economic formation have built-in limitations. Concepts such as 'people's democracies', 'national democratic State' can become a source of theoretical ambiguity if used abstractly to describe a whole range of situations whose only common feature is that successful assault on an existing social order has not yet matured into a socialist order.

*The fundamental question is: which class or alliance of classes exercises state power in the immediate post-liberation period?* Kwame Nkrumah's injunction to struggling national liberation movements was 'seek ye first the Political Kingdom'. But where, as in some of the ex-colonies, the inchoate state of class formation led to a loose alliance at the top, of mainly petit bourgeois elements, the capacity of the new Political Kingdoms to make planned advances towards socialism has been beset by difficulties and sudden reverses. If, on the other hand, the liberation struggle should bring to power a revolutionary democratic alliance dominated by the proletariat and the peasantry (*which is on the agenda in South Africa*), the post-revolutionary phase can surely become the first stage *in a continuous process* along the road to socialism: a road which ultimately can only be charted by the proletariat and its natural allies.

In both basic statements of programme previously cited, a speedy progression from formal liberation to lasting emancipation is advanced as the main perspective of the post-liberation state; a state dominated by the working class and peasantry which will, from its inception, begin to lay the basis for taking the country along the road to socialism. Without this there can be no real solution to the national or social problems for the majority of the South African people.

But this outcome is inevitable only in the abstract or conceptual sense. Its translation into reality must be dependent on a number of vital subjective factors. The most important of these are the ideological perception of the movements which constitute the liberation alliance; the extent to which the most revolutionary class - the proletariat - is politicized and participates as a leading force in the coming struggles and in the state forms which are constructed in place of the old; the degree to which petit bourgeois ideology and narrow nationalism is successfully combated within the national movement; and the extent to which the rural millions can be mobilized on the side of true liberation.

Masses do not of their own accord generate an ideology which provides true guidelines on the main direction of the struggle, or which makes them conscious of the necessity to create non-exploitative relations of production. Even in regard to the proletariat 'there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of the movement ... There is a lot of talk about spontaneity but a spontaneous development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology'.<sup>16</sup> And if it is true that workers left to themselves in direct conflict with their class enemy tend to be subordinated to bourgeois ideology, how much more true is this of a struggle whose main immediate content is national in

character? The continuing role of an independent class-based movement as part of the revolutionary front is thus historically vital, despite the absence of any basic policy divergence between the ANC and the SACP on, the main strategy and thrust of liberation aims.

Revolutionary leadership by a movement experienced in struggle is therefore the precondition for real victory. In South Africa the resistance to the conquest and its aftermath has been long and continuous. The organizational forms which have emerged to express and lead this resistance have their roots in specific historical factors and in the changes that have taken place in the socio-economic structure. We now turn to a brief examination of those main phases in the struggle which have a bearing on the development of the strategy and tactics of the South African revolution.

## Footnotes

### ***Chapter 2: The Theory of the South African Revolution***

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2. *Financial Mail*, 6 September 1974, p.901 (quoting Mike McGrath in a paper presented to a Durban economics conference).
3. *Survey of Race Relations*; South African Institute of Race Relations, (SAIRR), 1974, p.52.
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5. *Survey of Race Relations*, SAIRR, 1974, pp. 210-11.
6. T. M. Molathlwa, *South African Institute of Internal Affairs*, December 1974, pp. 11-12.
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8. H.J. Simons, 'What is Apartheid?', *Liberation*, No. 36, 1959 and 'Concepts of Apartheid', *Liberation*, No. 39, 1959.
9. 'Strategy and Tactics', (ANC), op. cit.
10. 'Strategy and Tactics', (ANC), op. cit.
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13. A. Zanzolo, 'The Theory of the South African Revolution', *African Communist*, 1st Quarter, 1963, p. 22.
14. Published by A.N.C. External Mission.
15. *ibid.*
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